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Abstract:  
Several recent studies have addressed household participation in the stock market, but 
relatively few have focused on household stock trading behavior. Household trading is 
important for the stock market, as households own more than 40% of the NYSE capitalization 
directly and can also influence trading patterns of institutional investors by adjusting their 
indirect stock holdings. Existing studies based on administrative data offer conflicting results. 
Discount brokerage data show excessive trading to the detriment of stockholders, while data 
on retirement accounts indicate extreme inactivity. This paper uses data representative of the 
population to document the extent of household portfolio inertia and to link it to household 
characteristics and to stock market movements. We document considerable portfolio inertia, 
as regards both changing stockholding participation status and trading stocks, and find that 
specific household characteristics contribute to the tendency to exhibit such inertia. Although 
our findings suggest some dependence of trading directly-held equity through brokerage 
accounts on the performance of the stock market index, they do not indicate that the recent 
expansion in the stockholder base and the experience of the stock market downswing have 
significantly altered the overall propensity of households to trade in stocks or to switch 
participation status in a way that could contribute to stock market instability. 
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1.  Introduction 
The spread of equity culture, namely the increase in the percentage of 
households participating in stockholding over the past twenty years, has now been 
extensively documented, both for the US and for major European countries (see 
Campbell, 2006; and the contributions in Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2001). Much 
less well understood are the stock trading behavior of households, the frequency with 
which they tend to move in and out of the stock market, and whether these have 
changed over time. Yet these issues are quite important, as households own about 
40% of the NYSE capitalization directly, and may additionally influence trading by 
institutional investors when they adjust their indirect stock holdings in mutual funds 
or retirement accounts. 
Recent theoretical models of household portfolio choice with background 
income risk imply that households should adjust their stockholding participation 
status or portfolio shares of risky assets in response to a variety of changes. These are 
either specific to the household - such as changes in wealth, income or age -  or 
features of the market environment - such as expected returns or return volatility - 
(see Campbell and Viceira, 2002; Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003; Cocco, Gomes, 
Maenhout, 2005; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005)..  
Although the existing empirical literature on stock trading by households is 
not extensive (see section 2 below), it already points to substantial heterogeneity in 
the frequency with which households trade stocks. There is stark contrast between 
administrative data on households with discount brokerage accounts and 
administrative data from retirement plans. The former imply overtrading to the 
households’ detriment, while the latter show widespread inactivity of households over 
periods of time as long as ten years. This sharp contrast makes it all the more   2
important to understand what drives trading differences in the household population at 
large, and whether and how trading frequency and entry and exit are influenced by 
household characteristics and by stock market conditions.  
Understanding frequencies of trading and of stock market entry and exit is 
particularly relevant in the face of changes in the composition of the stockholder pool, 
induced by the spread of equity culture since the early 1990s. An important lesson 
from the empirical literature on stock market participation is that certain household 
characteristics, such as high educational attainment or sizeable wealth or income, 
contribute to stock market participation, probably by allowing households to 
overcome fixed costs of entry into the market. It is then natural to expect that the 
spread of equity culture is likely to be associated with progressive entry of ‘marginal’ 
investors into the stockholder pool, with lower levels of education and more limited 
resources. This creates, in turn, concerns about stockholding levels likely to be chosen 
(or achieved) by a so-transformed stockholding pool, as well as about its trading 
practices and possible overreaction to market swings that could contribute to stock 
market volatility (see, for example, Guiso et al., 2003).  
Using cross-sectional data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and new 
methods to construct counterfactual distributions, Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos 
(2006) provide empirical evidence that this simple view of the evolution of the 
stockholder base may be unwarranted. The evidence suggests strongly that the stock 
market upswing of the 1990s did attract sizeable numbers of marginal stockholders, 
resulting in smaller stockholding levels across the distribution of holdings. However, 
entry and exit during the period immediately following the downswing are estimated 
to have resulted in a stockholder pool conducive to larger stockholding levels, 
presumably by discouraging marginal stockholders and attracting others whose   3
characteristics, attitudes, and financial practices favored larger holdings. The 
underlying idea that household portfolio behavior is not free of investment mistakes 
and that these mistakes are disproportionately present among particular demographic 
groups is consistent with a number of recent papers.
1  
This paper deals with stock market entry and exit and the frequency of trading 
by households, in the face of considerable spread of equity culture and of substantial 
stock market movements during the past two decades. It investigates whether we 
actually see marked changes in the incidence of entry and exit or in trading 
frequencies and patterns, as new stockholders are brought into the market and as the 
stock market swings up or down. It explores the role of household characteristics and 
of the stock market index in determining entry, exit, frequency, and direction of 
trading. The paper uses both panel data (from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics – 
PSID – using mainly the waves between 1994 and 2003 but sometimes going as far 
back as 1984); and a time series of cross sections (from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances – SCF – between 1989 and 2004). Various types of stockholding are 
considered, as available in the data (direct, through mutual funds, and through 
retirement accounts). As we are using data representative of the US population, we 
provide a reconciliation of overtrading results found in discount broker data with 
inertia results found in other administrative data. The upshot of the paper is that, while 
households with brokerage accounts do exhibit great incidence and frequency of 
trading as well as sensitivity to stock market movements, the bulk of the population 
exhibits considerable inertia, both in terms of trading and in terms of changing 
participation status. We do not find evidence of a change in this degree of inertia 
across the stock market upswing and downswing or as stock market participation 
grew.    4
Section 2 of the paper surveys recent literature on stock trading by households. 
Section 3 discusses the theoretical background to the issue of portfolio inertia in 
stockholding. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents results from the PSID 
regarding participation inertia, combining all types of stockholding. Section 6 
discusses inertia in trading and trading practices regarding directly held stock and 
mutual funds. Section 7 reports findings on trading directly held stocks through 
brokerage accounts, based on the SCF. Section 8 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Existing Literature 
Most of the existing literature on stock trading by households has focused on 
administrative data sets, with only a few studies using surveys representative of the 
US population. Even within studies using administrative data, there is a stark contrast 
between studies that document excessive trading and others that document 
considerable inactivity on the part of households.  
Barber and Odean (2000) study households with accounts at a large US 
discount broker, who provides trading services for common stocks without financial 
advice, during the period 1991 to 1996. They show that such households tend to 
engage in excessive stock trading, arguably because of overconfidence, and that this 
results in net stock portfolio returns substantially below the market, mainly because it 
causes them to pay enormous transactions costs. The average household in their 
sample turns over 75 percent of its portfolio annually. They aptly summarize their 
findings as showing that ‘trading is hazardous to your wealth’. Barber and Odean 
(2001) document that men trade 45 percent more than women and earn annual risk-
adjusted net returns that are 1.4 percent less than those earned by women.
2 Ivković, 
Poterba and Weisbenner (2004) use the same data set and distinguish between trading   5
on taxable and tax-deferred accounts. They find differences in trading patterns that are 
consistent with expected effects of capital gains taxation. 
While researchers using discount broker accounts and general stock market 
registers wonder why there is so much trading, those who focus on individual 
retirement accounts find a great degree of portfolio inactivity. The literature on 
retirement accounts, based on various administrative data sets, points to a pronounced 
tendency of most participants to be passive and do nothing, or what Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988) called ‘status quo bias in decision making’. Ameriks and Zeldes 
(2004) use panel quarterly data on (tax-deferred) retirement account balances and 
contributions held by TIAA-CREF, with participants drawn mainly from faculty and 
other full-time employees at US institutions of higher education and research. 
Although their main focus is on estimating age effects on portfolio composition, they 
also report evidence on trading inertia. They find that over a ten-year period (1987-
1996), close to 50 percent of their sample made no changes to the share of stocks in 
either their retirement accumulation or in their flow contributions, despite the 
negligible cost of making such changes.
3  
Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2004) follow a panel of nearly seven thousand 
401(k) retirement accounts from April 1994 to August 1998 and find very limited 
portfolio reshuffling, in sharp contrast to existing evidence from discount brokerage 
accounts. Over 87% observations of annual number of trades in their panel are zero, 
and only 7% of the observations exceed one. 
Huberman and Sengmueller (2004) study the dynamics of investment in 
company stock within 401(k) plans, by employees working in that company. Using 
aggregate (plan-level) data, constructed from SEC filings, on a panel of 153 plans 
over at most eight years (1991-98), they study the determinants of transfers in and out   6
of the company stock as a fraction of all assets in the plan, and the fraction of new 
savings invested in company stock. They find that good past returns attract more 
investments, but bad past returns do not cause reduction in plan holdings of company 
stock.
4 As their data are aggregate and contain no information on participant 
characteristics, they do not study the role of variation in individual attributes. They do 
stress, however, that participants in defined contribution plans make very few active 
changes to their portfolios, and that the effects they find are due to the action of the 
minority of alert participants. 
Administrative data sets have certain advantages and disadvantages relative to 
survey data. On the positive side, administrative data sets tend to be less subject to 
measurement error and reporting biases than survey data. They track closely the same 
accounts over extended periods of time, providing exact information on the frequency 
of trading and on the size of trades. They also make it possible to estimate account-
specific rates of portfolio returns and to analyze performance of individual investors 
relative to the market, and trades in response to past own performance. 
On the negative side, they tend to involve selected samples, as the authors 
recognize. For example, those with a discount broker account are most likely to be 
households that want to trade in the stock market and feel confident that they can do 
so without advice from the brokerage firm (hence their use of discount rather than 
retail brokers); TIAA-CREF participants are drawn from a specific sector and tend to 
be more highly educated than the general population, and so on. Secondly, since only 
accounts are tracked, these data sets are good for analyzing trading behavior but less 
appropriate for analyzing entry and exit into the stock market. Third, they give a 
partial view of stockholding behavior, as they only focus on one aspect of 
stockholding, be it direct holding of common stocks or holding of retirement   7
accounts, with specific liquidity characteristics and costs of rebalancing. For example, 
infrequent trading on retirement accounts may simply be the result of unwillingness of 
households to alter their retirement planning, while they would be willing to reshuffle 
the rest of their portfolio; or it may be a sign of extreme portfolio inertia, given that 
reallocations of accumulations in, or flow contributions to retirement accounts are 
nearly costless. Finally, administrative data sets typically contain small amounts of 
information regarding household demographics and the overall household portfolio, 
and they do not allow study of the influence of such household characteristics on 
portfolio inertia. 
To our knowledge, there is little previous work on active trading of stocks 
using survey data representative of the population, and it has a different focus. In an 
early paper, Souleles (1999) studies determinants of the size of securities purchases, 
combining data from the CEX and from the Michigan consumer sentiment surveys. 
He finds that household-specific hedging motives have independent predictive power 
for the size of securities purchases above and beyond the information in returns, with 
marginal effects estimated to be bigger than those of returns. Given the short panel 
dimension of the CEX, where each household is surveyed four times but only for one 
year in total, and the use of two complementary data sources for the same regressions, 
Souleles had to rely on extensive imputations for some of the key explanatory 
variables in his regressions.  
Guskova, Juster, and Stafford (2004) use PSID data from 1994 and 1999 and 
compare the relevance of wealth and income for stock market participation in the two 
years, in order to provide a test of simple cost-based explanations for participation. 
They find an increased role for income and wealth variables in 1999, and evidence 
that lower mortgage payments contributed to purchasing stocks during that period.   8
In a very recent paper, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005) study the issue of 
whether wealth fluctuations induce changes in risk aversion, by looking at portfolio 
shares conditional on participation, and using survey data from PSID and CEX. They 
find that wealth shocks do not induce households to increase their portfolio share in 
risky assets, conditional on participation in risky assets, but that capital gains and 
losses do have an impact, with capital gains continuing to affect portfolio shares even 
after five years. In addition to delivering the authors’ main point against time-varying 
risk aversion, both findings are consistent with inertia in trading stocks, conditional on 
participation, and they nicely complement our findings on participation and trading 
inertia across the population of stockholders and non-stockholders.  
 
3.  Theoretical Background 
There is no general theory of what determines stock trading behavior. 
Implications of theoretical models range from no trading at all
5 (Milgrom and Stokey, 
1982) to trading up to the point of equating the marginal benefit of trading to the 
marginal cost of doing so (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), to models of overconfidence 
where investors trade to their detriment (e.g., Odean, 1998). In this section, we briefly 
discuss theoretical insights to determinants of entry and exit and of stock trading by 
households derived from the body of recent literature on household portfolio choice in 
the face of background, non-asset income risk.
6  
Fixed entry costs are probably the dominant explanation of limited 
participation in the stock market in existing literature, and thus a key component of 
understanding what limits entry into the stock market.
7 Factors that reduce the amount 
of stockholding that the household would undertake if it gained access to the stock 
market also serve to reduce the probability that it would decide to pay any given fixed   9
cost to switch participation status from non-stockholder to stockholder. Similarly, 
factors that raise the size of fixed entry costs faced by a household for given demand 
for stocks, work in the same direction.  
Theory leads us to expect positive roles of wealth and of non-asset income on 
the probability of entry, mainly because of the positive effect of cash on hand on stock 
demand. The role of educational attainment is more involved. Higher educational 
attainment tends to be associated empirically with steeper age-earnings profiles and 
with lower variances of shocks to labor income.
8 This alone would make more 
educated households less likely to save (to provide for the future and for shocks to 
income), but this factor can be offset by lower costs faced by the more educated in 
gathering and processing information relative to stockholding. Empirical participation 
studies usually find that higher education contributes to stockholding participation.  
Poor health increases the costs of processing information, may be associated 
with committed expenditures on health care, and may raise the perceived risk of 
future health expenditures. While higher precautionary wealth demand could boost 
stock demand, it seems likely that higher participation costs and committed 
expenditures among people of poor health would discourage entry in the stock 
market.  
Retirement implies dependence on accumulated assets rather than on human 
wealth for financing consumption, more limited opportunities for time diversification 
of bad shocks (see Gollier, 2001), and more limited possibilities for alleviating such 
shocks through borrowing and varying labor supply. All these factors would make 
likely a negative effect on the likelihood of entering the stock market. Finally, 
empirical participation studies imply that belonging to a minority reduces the 
probability of participation. This is usually interpreted as reflecting more limited  10
targeting of minorities by the financial sector, which would in turn suggest that 
minorities are less likely to switch into stockholding, controlling for other factors. 
Exits from the stock market (i.e. switches from participation to non-
participation status) are more involved, yet present in the data, as we shall see below.
9 
Models with borrowing constraints in the form of no-short-sales restrictions on stocks 
and on the riskless asset imply that a drop in current cash on hand (relative to the 
permanent component of non-asset income) can push a household into the region of 
binding borrowing constraints, where the desire to borrow is so pronounced that no 
stockholding takes place. In these models, this induces an exit from stockholding. 
Exit from stockholding could be generated for a broader class of households 
by the presence of recurring participation costs. Factors that generate low demand for 
stocks (e.g., low resources, aging, retirement) can prompt households to exit when 
their desired exposure to stocks is not big enough to justify paying the recurring cost 
of participation. Such tendency to exit would be tempered by having to face re-entry 
costs that are high relative to continuing participation costs, as well as by any trading 
fees (such as commissions and bid-ask spreads). 
Exits should also depend on accumulated capital gains or losses of the 
household in tax systems where gains are taxed at realization, or when behavioral 
finance considerations such as the ‘disposition effect’ of Shefrin and Statman (1985) 
are important. Capital gains taxation tends to contribute to a lock-in effect, i.e. a 
reduced tendency of investors to sell appreciated stock, so as to avoid paying the 
associated capital gains tax, and an increased tendency to sell depreciated stock. The 
disposition effect works in the opposite direction. It is associated with investor 
unwillingness to admit failure and to dispose of assets that have declined in value; and  11
with investor willingness to sell appreciated assets, lest capital gains turn into capital 
losses. 
Let us now turn to the probability of trading. For households that do not 
currently hold stocks, a decision to actively enter the stock market should imply a 
decision to purchase (trade) stocks. So, the factors that we have identified as playing a 
role in entry should apply also to inducing purchases by current non-stockholders. For 
current stockholders, a decision to buy stocks should result from factors that raise the 
demand for stocks relative to current holdings, such as an increase in cash on hand, an 
improvement in the perceived equity premium, a reduction in perceived stock market 
volatility, improved consumer confidence and expectations regarding future incomes, 
or an improved health condition. Good performance of the market could also induce 
purchases, if it leads to expectations of better future performance, rationally or 
irrationally. ‘Return chasing’ behavior would fall under this category. 
To a first approximation, decisions to sell stocks should arise symmetrically. 
Departures from this symmetry could be induced by tax considerations, such as 
capital gains taxation at realization, or by behavioral factors such as the disposition 
effect favoring trades in one direction rather than the other. ‘Overconfidence’, 
stressed in the work of Barber and Odean, would encourage excessive trading in both 
directions, lowering realized returns net of transactions costs. 
There is no reason to expect that the same patterns of participation and trading 
inertia should be observed across all types of stockholding, from direct stockholding, 
to mutual funds, to stockholding in retirement accounts. Trading costs are not in 
general the same across these stockholding locations, tax implications of trades are 
not the same, and investor willingness to trade need not be the same across different 
types of stockholding. For example, retirement accounts often allow costless changes  12
in allocations or in the composition of new flows (e.g., via the internet) and do not 
entail tax consequences: stocks can be exchanged for the riskless fund without tax 
consequences, even when they have incurred capital gains. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, trades of directly held stocks may be costly, both in terms of commissions 
and bid-ask spreads but also in terms of their consequences for capital gains taxes. 
Even for given costs and tax considerations, households may have lower willingness 
to engage in speculative trading of their retirement accumulations compared to mutual 
funds and directly held stocks.
10 
 
4.  The Data 
In this paper, we use panel data from various waves of the PSID, a 
longitudinal survey that offers a broad set of information on a representative sample 
of US individuals and their families; and repeated cross sections from the SCF, which 
is not subject to top coding and includes even more detailed information on portfolios.  
The PSID has been interviewing households on an annual basis between 1968 and 
1996. Since 1996, interviews are contacted biennially. In this paper, we employ data 
from 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2001, i.e. the survey years that provide detailed 
information on various household wealth components. We also make use of recently 
released data from 2003.  
In all of our analysis, we study families that experienced no change in their 
head. Up to and including the 1994 interview, households were asked whether they 
owned any shares of stocks in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment 
trusts - including stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs. From 1999 onwards, 
there is a separate question regarding ownership of IRAs, as well as information on 
whether IRAs are mostly invested in stocks, interest earning assets, or split between  13
the two. Based on the latter responses, we allocate 75%, 25% and 50% of the value of 
IRA to stocks, respectively. 
In our regression analysis, we control separately for net financial and net real 
wealth, to allow for differential effects of wealth components that differ in liquidity. 
Net financial wealth comprises the total amount held in liquid assets (checking and 
savings accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposits, savings bonds, or 
treasury bills), money in private annuities and IRAs, bonds, cash value in a life 
insurance policy and other assets (a valuable collection for investment purposes,   
rights in a trust or estate), stocks (shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual 
funds, investment trusts), minus other debts (such as credit cards, student loans, 
medical or legal bills, or loans from relatives).
11 Net real wealth is derived as the sum 
of home equity (value of the home minus remaining mortgage principal), equity in 
other real estate, equity in a farm or business plus equity in vehicles.
12 
In each interview households were asked about transactions they made in 
stocks since the last survey year with a wealth supplement (e.g. in 1999 survey for the 
time from 1994 to 1999).  They were asked to give details on whether they purchased 
or sold stocks and the amounts they put in or took out of stocks. Information 
regarding the within-interval frequency of such trading is not available. 
Up to 1994 this series of questions refers to transaction in stocks generally, 
including those invested in IRAs. From 1999 onwards respondents were asked about 
transactions in non-IRA stocks. Hence, in post-1994 surveys, information on stock 
transactions in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts, 
including any automatic reinvestments – but not including any IRAs, is available. We 
mainly look at such transactions that took place between 1994 and 1999 and between 
1999 and 2003. The analysis for the latter period is feasible after combining the  14
relevant information from 1999-2001 and 2001-2003 sub-periods. We also look at 
transactions prior to 1994, however these refer to a broader definition that takes also 
into account IRA stocks. 
We also employ data from the 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 
Surveys of Consumer Finances (see Appendix B for description of variables).   
Compared to PSID, they are not subject to top coding, and they provide a detailed 
wealth breakdown and useful information on households’ financial attitudes and 
practices. Nevertheless, the SCF does not track the same unit over time. Households 
are asked first whether they hold a brokerage account for the purchase or sale of 
stocks and other securities. Households with brokerage accounts are then asked how 
many times they bought or sold stocks through a broker during the last year, allowing 
a comparison of trading practices with the general population. 
 
5.  Stock Market Entry and Exit 
5.1. Maintaining Participation Status 
We first look at inertia in participation, namely the tendency to have the same 
participation status in stockholding at the end of the sample period as at the 
beginning. Both conceptually and in practice, participation inertia is distinct from 
trading inertia. In principle, changing stockholding participation status does not 
require a household to trade. For example, receiving stocks as a part of bequests or 
transferring stocks to children as a gift during a household’s life would induce such 
changes in participation status without registering trades.  
In the data, PSID responses to trading questions do not always match up with 
responses to questions on stockholding participation. Some of these may reflect stock 
transfers without trades, some may arise purely from survey collection practices,
13  15
while others may be due to recall bias (see also Vissing Jorgensen, 2002), but it is 
impossible to tell what is the reason for the mismatch and which of the two responses 
(on ownership or on trading) is inaccurate. Our choice to analyze first participation 
and then trading patterns allows us not to throw away these observations, most of 
which are likely to represent legitimate statements about at least one of these two 
types of inertia.  
Tables 1a and 1b present a breakdown of households according to their 
combination of participation status at the endpoints of periods 1994-1999 and 1999-
2003, using 1999 sample weights for both panels. This shows a tendency of the vast 
majority of households to exhibit the same participation status over time. Comparing 
1994 to 1999 (Table 1a), we see that about three quarters of the sample were in the 
same participation status at the end of the period as at the beginning, with slightly 
more than forty percent remaining non-participants. About 8 percent were 
stockholders at the beginning of the period but not at the end, while 18 percent had 
moved in the opposite direction.  
Comparing the peak of the stock market, 1999, to 2003 after the downfall 
(Table 1b), we find that just under 80 percent of households were exhibiting the same 
participation status at the beginning and at the end of the period, which is even larger 
than during the period of the stock market upswing. The remaining 20 percent 
switched status, with slightly more switching into stockownership, despite the 
intervening market downfall.
14 Of course, looking only at end points does not 
necessarily imply that households did not trade within the period. This is an issue 
which we will examine later in the paper. 
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5.2. Determinants of Conditional Participation Probabilities 
In this section, we ask which factors tend to influence entry and exit across 
two periods of interest: the period encompassing the substantial stock market 
expansion, 1994 to 1999, and the one encompassing the major market downfall, 1999 
to 2003. We consider ownership in directly held stocks, in mutual funds, in 
investment trusts, and in employer-based pensions and IRAs. 
For each period, we estimate a bivariate probit, allowing unobserved 
heterogeneity to influence participation decisions at both interval end points, and each 
observable factor to have potentially different effects at each end point. Indeed, we 
find positive correlation between unobserved factors influencing participation at the 
beginning and at the end of the period. We consider balanced samples across two 
nodes at a time, but we do not require households to be present in all three years 1994, 
1999, and 2003. Households with zero wealth at both end points of an interval are 
excluded from estimation, so as not to equate stock market non-participation with the 
decision to hold no assets at all (or the inability to do so). 
Tables 2 and 3 present marginal effects from bivariate probit regressions 
regarding ownership decisions at the beginning and at the end of the two periods: 
1994-1999, and 1999-2003. In this paper, we try to avoid some pitfalls involved in 
automatic computation of marginal effects by standard econometric software, which 
have recently been emphasized. We explain how we overcome these problems in 
Appendix A. We find that typical results of static participation studies convey to 
bivariate probits across two periods. We do not find pronounced age effects on 
participation, except for a negative effect of being young. Having more children 
discourages stock market participation. This is likely to be due to the current cost and 
projected future committed expenditures on children, which seem to dominate the  17
incentive to take advantage of the wealth-building potential of the equity premium 
and any motives to bequeath capital gains assets.  
Belonging to a minority strongly discourages stockholding participation, and 
this is true in all years under consideration. We do find that poor health discourages 
participation, but the finding is not consistently present across all years and periods. 
We confirm the strong positive role of education on participation found in many other 
participation studies. The level of resources, whether in the form of income, net 
financial wealth, or net real wealth also encourages participation. Controlling for 
current resources, stock market participation is further encouraged by having received 
an inheritance within the past 5 years. By contrast, we do not find any effect on 
participation of having moved during the period. 
Figure 1 plots predicted conditional probabilities of participation, estimated 
using the bivariate probit estimates, for households that find themselves at the 25
th, 
the 50
th, or the 75
th percentile of each of the distributions of income, net financial 
wealth, and net real wealth, and who have their remaining characteristics set equal to 
the respective weighted sample medians. We know from the participation literature 
that the unconditional probability of participation (non-participation) is increasing 
(decreasing) in the level of household resources and in the position of the household 
in the distribution of resources. Figure 1 shows that analogous results hold also for the 
conditional probabilities of participation and non-participation, whether we condition 
on beginning-of-period participation or non-participation. Probabilities of 
participation (non-participation), conditional on beginning-of-period participation 
(non-participation), decrease (increase) with the position of the household in the 
distribution of resources (income, non-stock financial wealth, and real wealth).  18
Participation inertia is evident in Figure 1. Conditional on any participation 
status at the beginning of the period, the probability of exhibiting the same status at 
the end of the period is greater than the probability of exhibiting a changed status. 
Estimated probabilities of stock market participation at the end of the period, 
conditional on participation at the beginning of the period, are not very dissimilar 
across the stock market expansion and contraction, suggesting that they are not 
particularly sensitive to the stock market environment. We find more sizeable 
differences in the probability of non-participation at the end of the period, conditional 
on zero stockholding at the beginning. Conditional probabilities of staying out of the 
market are higher following the stock market downturn than over the boom, for all 
resource percentiles considered. These results suggest that the stock market downturn 
has mainly discouraged non-participants from entering rather than encouraging a mass 
exodus from the stock market. 
Figure 2 plots the same estimated conditional probabilities, now varying the 
educational attainment of the household head. These confirm the presence of 
participation inertia for households with high school education or below. They show, 
however, that a college degree contributes to overcoming inertia in terms of staying 
out of the market. Controlling for all other characteristics (set at the median level), 
college graduates are actually more likely to switch into ownership than to remain 
non-participants, both before and after the stock market downswing. Regardless of 
education, the household that is median in terms of other characteristics has higher 
probability to stay out of the market after the downswing than during the upswing. 
Conditional probabilities of exiting are quite similar before and after the downswing, 
with high school graduates exhibiting some increase in their exit probability, 
controlling for other characteristics.  19
Table 4.1 presents results on the role of further factors in a different, more 
compact way. We compute marginal effects, interpreted as effects on the estimated 
probability of having exited from the stock market by the end of the period, 
conditional on being a participant at the start of the period. This computation provides 
answers to the important question of which characteristics contributed to stock market 
exits during the upswing and following the downswing, and by how much.  
Controlling for other characteristics, white non-hispanic households are less 
likely to exit, conditional on owning at the beginning of the period. The effect is large 
in both periods, but even larger in the bad times. Poor health does not influence the 
conditional probability of exit during the upswing, but it does raise it during the 
downswing by about 6 percentage points. Lower household resources, whether in the 
form of income, non-stock net financial wealth, or net real wealth, significantly 
encourage exit from the stock market, both in good and in bad times. The marginal 
effect is larger in bad times, especially for income but also for net financial wealth, 
though not for net real wealth. Thus, liquid resources seem to matter for staying in the 
market, controlling for other characteristics, and this result is intuitively appealing. 
All in all, our conclusion on entry and exit for all types of stockholding 
combined is that they are significantly influenced by a number of household 
characteristics, but they have not changed much across the period of the stock market 
upswing or downswing. The downswing is more likely to have encouraged staying 
out, rather than getting out of the market. Nevertheless, it also seems to have 
strengthened the effects of several factors, including minority status, poor health, and 
liquid resources, on conditional probabilities of exit from the stock market. 
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6.  Trading Incidence and Patterns 
In this Section, we study household trading behavior in periods of different 
stock market conditions. Using the survey responses in PSID, we classify households 
into those who undertake no trade in stocks in the period considered, those who only 
buy stocks, those who only sell stocks, and those who report both buying and selling 
stocks. In order to be able to compare the periods before and after the stock market 
downswing, trading here refers to stocks other than stocks in IRA’s. This is imposed 
on us by data limitations, but it provides a nice complement to the work of Ameriks 
and Zeldes (2004) that focuses on (TIAA-CREF) retirement portfolios.  
Although we do not know the actual number of transactions undertaken by 
households who trade during a given period
15, it is reasonable to expect that 
households who report having traded on both sides of the market are on average more 
active traders than those having traded in only one direction. We do not combine 
households who report buying only and selling only, so as to be able to distinguish 
trading against the market from trading with the market. 
 
6.1. Trading Incidence and Patterns Across Demographic Groups 
In Tables 5a-d, we consider a full balanced panel of households in 1994, 1999, 
2001, and 2003, using 1999 sample weights, to trace any changes in their trading 
incidence and patterns across the stock market upswing and downswing. We consider 
the period of stock market boom (1994-1999), and the period following the stock 
market downswing (1999-2003), which are of almost equal length, so that 
comparisons of rates of inertia between them are meaningful. The period following 
the burst of the bubble is further broken down into two sub-periods: the immediate 
aftermath of the downswing (1999-2001), and the subsequent period (2001-2003), by  21
which households have had time to process the implications of the downswing and to 
adjust their portfolios.  
As shown in Table 5a, the vast majority of households exhibit complete trade 
inactivity, with almost three quarters of them not reporting any stock market trade 
during the five year boom period considered. The proportion of households who 
report no trade during the subsequent four-year period is only slightly smaller. The 
substantial drop in the stock market that took place around 2000 was not associated 
with sizeable increases in the incidence of stock market trading in the population. 
Looking at the three other columns of Table 5a, we find that the downswing was also 
not associated with massive increases in the proportion of households who only sold 
stock, and if anything it was associated with some increase in trading in both 
directions.   
We also break down the period following the downswing into two sub-
periods, namely 1999-2001 and 2001-2003. Given the smaller length of these periods 
compared to the original ones, it is not surprising to observe a larger degree of 
inactivity. We do find evidence of somewhat greater inactivity in the period that is 
more distant to the stock market downswing of 2000 than in the one immediately 
following it. Among those who did trade, we find that lower proportions of 
households undertook any stock purchases (either on their own or in conjunction with 
stock sales) in the 2001-3 period relative to the 1999-2001 period, and more only sold 
stocks although they still do not account for more than 3.5 percent of households.  
Table 5b shows trade inactivity and trading patterns for different groups of 
educational attainment. These do suggest that inactivity is more limited across more 
educated groups, but even among college graduates, the majority reports no trade in 
each of the two longer periods considered, 1994-9 and 1999-2003. Comparing the two  22
sub-periods following the downswing, we see that rates of inertia in trade were higher 
in the second half of the period, at least for those with a high school certificate or 
more.  
Looking at different age groups in Table 5c, we see that inactivity is spread 
across all ages, but we observe a U-shaped pattern, with inactivity being higher for 
households with heads below 35 and above 65 years, and somewhat lower in the 
intermediate age categories. Comparing the upswing to the post-downswing periods, 
we do not find dramatic changes in proportions of households not trading at all, 
except perhaps for signs of increased activity among those in the 49-65 age group. 
Proportions of inactive households have also slightly risen among households 35 
years old or younger following the downswing. The U-shaped pattern is preserved 
when we break down the post-downswing period into 1999-2001 and 2001-2003, with 
all groups exhibiting somewhat higher inactivity in the latter period. 
There are pronounced differences in inactivity across net wealth percentiles, as 
shown in Table 5d. Households that are higher up in the net wealth distribution 
(excluding wealth held in stocks) tend to exhibit lower inactivity with respect to 
stocks compared to those lower in the distribution. While the proportion of 
households not trading stocks is higher following the downswing than before among 
the bottom two quartiles of the (non-equity) net wealth distribution, it is lower among 
the top two quartiles, especially in the top one where the bulk of stockholding is 
concentrated. Comparing the two sub-periods following the downswing, we find 
increased inactivity in the second sub-period among all wealth quartiles, with the 
difference being most pronounced in the richest quartile. 
Table 6 takes a more macroscopic view of trading inactivity and stock trading 
patterns, looking at the entire period from 1984 to 2003.
16 It should be recalled that  23
the asset classes included in the questions on trading were broader up until 1994 and 
narrower from 1999 on, as explained above. Even with these limitations, Table 6 
confirms the impression that overall trading inertia remains more or less at the same 
levels, with very small increases in the proportion of households trading, despite stock 
market fluctuations and the spread of equity culture.
17 
 
6.2. Determinants of Inactivity and of Trading Practices 
In this Section, we study the role of a number of household characteristics in 
determining inactivity and trading patterns for stocks not held in IRAs, controlling for 
remaining characteristics. We run two multinomial logits, one for 1994-99, and the 
other for 1999-2003. In each case, we divide households into five, mutually exclusive, 
categories. The first comprises those who do not trade stocks at all during the 
estimation period and also do not report ownership of stocks in either period. The 
second represents those who do not trade but report owning stocks in at least one of 
the two interview years. These distinguish between those who do not trade because 
they have no involvement with stocks and those who are involved but inactive. With 
regard to households reporting some trading activity, three other choices are 
considered: to only buy stocks, to only sell, and to trade in both directions.
18  
Tables 7 and 8 report marginal effects for the presence and type of trading that 
took place between 1994-1999 and 1999-2003, respectively.
19 During the upswing, 
and controlling for other factors, being younger than 50 makes households more 
likely not to have any involvement in stocks (relative to those between 50 and 65), but 
if they do, to show some trading activity. Interestingly, age effects on trading activity 
essentially disappear after the stock market downturn. This suggests that the 
experience of the downturn may have discouraged young people from trading stocks  24
in order to build their portfolios, but we also do not find evidence that they were 
selling stocks to shift their portfolios towards other assets. Being above 65 does not 
appear to influence inactivity, either before or after the downturn. This argues against 
pure horizon effects that should induce households to sell stocks, and is consistent 
with findings in the literature on conditional portfolio shares that finds no systematic 
reduction in stock exposure as the household ages. Similarly, entering retirement does 
not appear to encourage unidirectional sales of stock to finance retirement 
consumption, nor trade in both directions. 
Having more children not only discourages participation in the stock market, 
but also discourages options that involve purchase of stocks, both before and after the 
downswing. A larger number of children acts both as a strain on current resources and 
as committed future expenditures that discourage exposure to stockholding risk. 
These considerations appear to dominate the motive to exploit the equity premium in 
order to build up future wealth. 
Controlling for other factors, minority households tend to exhibit greater 
tendency towards inertia in trade, in addition to their known tendency to be less likely 
to participate, both before and after the stock market downswing. This may be related 
to more limited targeting of minorities by the financial sector.  
We do not find strong health effects on portfolio inactivity or on trading 
patterns in this quite representative sample of households from all age groups. We do 
find overall positive effects of education on encouraging trading in any direction, 
controlling for other factors. Effects are stronger following the downswing: they are 
uniformly positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, whether we refer 
to high-school education or to college degree. This implies that educated households 
were more likely to respond to the downswing through active trading.  25
Higher income or higher net financial wealth encourages purchases of stocks 
alone as well as in conjunction with stock sales. Net real wealth has no effect prior to 
the downswing, but following the downswing it strongly encourages purchases of 
stock, even combined with sales. The fall in stock prices may have encouraged 
households with substantial holdings of real equity to trade in stocks, either 
liquidating some of their real wealth or switching out of less risky assets. 
Receipt of inheritance or large gifts often represents a sizeable increase in 
household resources and one that is in a form not chosen by the household in question 
but by the person leaving the bequest. Both features could be expected to encourage 
stock trades. The PSID asks respondents whether they have received inheritance or 
large gifts in the five-year period preceding the interview. We find that trading 
responses of households to receipts of inheritance or large gifts are fairly similar but 
not identical to their responses to other changes in their wealth, and that they seem to 
be different before and after the stock market downswing. Receipt of inheritance or 
large gifts, either prior to the beginning of the period or during the period, consistently 
encourages simultaneous sales and purchases of stock, both before and after the stock 
market downswing. However, receipt of inheritance or large gifts during the upswing 
seems to encourage stock purchases, while during the downswing it encourages stock 
sales.
20  
  
7.  Trading through Brokerage Accounts 
Given the tension between empirical studies that use administrative data on 
brokerage accounts and on retirement accounts, we also report results on trading of 
directly held stocks through brokerage accounts from a data set that is representative of 
the population, namely the SCF. Such data give us the chance to take into account the  26
bias that selected sub-samples usually entail. Furthermore we can take advantage of the 
more detailed information on all wealth components, demographics and various 
financial attitudes and practices offered by the SCF. The SCF asks households first 
whether they have a brokerage account. Those who answer that they do are then asked 
whether they have traded and how many times they have traded over the year prior to 
the year of the Survey. We use all available waves of cross-sectional data, from 1989 to 
2004.  
Table 9 provides a clue to understanding the huge discrepancy in conclusions 
from existing research based on owners of brokerage accounts and on other segments of 
the population. The first column reports the percentage of households who hold equity 
directly during the Survey year. As is well known, this percentage did not vary much 
during the 1990s, and remains at a high value even following the stock market 
downswing. The second column shows the percentages of households that report 
having a brokerage account. This can be either a retail account or a discount brokerage 
account, and it is thus an overestimate of those who own a discount brokerage account 
in the population. We see that in all years, less than 20% of households have a 
brokerage account. We also observe an increase in these percentages, which resulted in 
doubling the proportion of brokerage account owners between 1989 and 2001, followed 
by a decline in 2004.  
The third column shows the percentage of households in the population who 
bought or sold stocks or other securities through a broker during the year preceding the 
Survey. While this percentage also nearly doubled during the period under 
consideration, it remained well below 15% of the population. However, when 
expressed as a percentage of brokerage account owners, it shows that between two 
thirds and three quarters of such owners actually traded in the year preceding each SCF.  27
Although relatively few households do own brokerage accounts, the vast majority of 
owners trade even in the space of a year. This fundamental difference in behavior 
underlies the very different results obtained to date on the basis of different sets of 
administrative accounts. 
Econometric analysis allows us to probe further into the role that characteristics 
play in determining ownership of brokerage accounts, and the role characteristics and 
market conditions play in determining both whether trading through brokerage accounts 
occurs and how frequent it is. We find that household characteristics have a significant 
role to play, but so do stock market conditions that were not found to influence the 
population at large.  
We pool data from SCFs between 1989 and 2004 and estimate a two step probit 
regression,which allows for selection. The first stage models the probability of having a 
brokerage account, while the second models the probability of having traded through a 
brokerage account during the year prior to the Survey. Table 10 summarizes the results. 
The first column refers to marginal effects on the probability of holding a brokerage 
account and the second displays conditional marginal effects for the incidence of stock 
trading through a brokerage account during the year prior to the Survey.  
In addition to allowing for a number of household characteristics, we include in 
the first stage a full set of time dummies, while in the second we proxy for stock market 
performance by including the percentage growth in the S&P 500 index, deflated by the 
CPI-U, for the year prior to the Survey. As no single household is a big enough trader 
to influence the stock price index, these growth rates are truly exogenous to its decision 
whether to trade or not. These prior-year S&P real growth rates were positive for all 
Surveys, except for 1995 and 2001.
21 Apart from the S&P real growth rates and a 
dummy representing years which show a negative rate, we also include in our  28
specification an interaction term allowing the coefficient on the real growth rate of the 
index to differ between periods of upswing and downswing.  
Our findings reject the null of zero correlation between unobserved 
determinants of the two decisions. This implies that we cannot ignore the selection 
mechanism (probability of owning brokerage accounts) when studying the incidence of 
trading directly held stocks. We find sizeable marginal effects of the education 
variables on the probability of owning a brokerage account, with a college graduate 
being 14 percent more likely to own such an account. Strong positive effects were also 
obtained with respect to financial control variables, bequest motive, expressed 
willingness to take above average financial risk, and the number of financial institutions 
that a household does business with. On the other hand, poor health and children reduce 
the probability of having a brokerage account. Finally, the time dummies suggest a 
significant increase in ownership of brokerage accounts throughout the period under 
consideration. 
Turning to the results from the second stage, both growth rate terms exhibit 
strongly significant conditional marginal effects, implying that stock market 
performance exerts an important influence on trading of directly held stocks through 
brokerage accounts. In particular, we find that after controlling for various household 
characteristics, an assumed 1 p.p. increase in the S&P real growth rate during stock 
market expansions and contractions contributes .009 and -.015 respectively to the 
incidence of trading through a brokerage account. It is worth noting that estimated 
effects of changes in the index are greater during a contraction rather than an expansion 
of a given size.
22 Based on these findings, the incidence of trading directly held stocks, 
conditional on having a brokerage account, is likely to be greater during downswings, 
controlling for household characteristics. However, this does not necessarily imply  29
stock sales: increased incidence of trades could refer to purchases, sales, or trades in 
both directions.  
Other factors that significantly affect the probability of trading within a year, 
given brokerage account ownership and controlling for remaining factors, are net 
financial and net real wealth, being a college graduate, the willingness to take more 
than average financial risk, and reporting a bequest motive. Bequest motives could 
contribute to the incidence of trading through brokerage accounts either by simply 
encouraging purchases to accumulate stocks or by encouraging more active 
management of stock portfolios. Thus, the discouragement effect on trading that arises 
from ‘step up of basis’ provisions for bequeathed capital gains seems to be dominated 
by other considerations. On the other hand, factors like race, gender, marital status, 
presence of children, health status and credit constraints, which were significant for 
brokerage account ownership, no longer affect the incidence of trading among owners 
of such accounts.   
Finally, we go a step further, from modeling the incidence of trading to 
modeling the frequency of trading. To this end, we estimate a two-step Heckman model 
where we first model the probability of holding brokerage accounts followed by 
estimation of the (logarithm) of the number of trades reported within a year. This yields 
very similar results to those we presented in Table 10 and are not shown for brevity. 
The effect of growth in the real S&P 500 index is still present, suggesting a similar 
pattern to the one we found earlier for the incidence of trading. Gender is now added to 
the factors reported earlier as having a significant effect on the probability of trading. 
The role of gender is consistent with the findings of Barber and Odean (2001) for 
administrative accounts.  30
The conclusion from this section is that household characteristics are quite 
important even for the incidence and frequency of trading directly held stocks through 
brokerage accounts. The direction of their effects seems broadly similar to that 
regarding participation and other types of trading inertia. Our results suggest, however, 
that trading through brokerage accounts tends to be quite sensitive to movements in the 
stock market index, unlike what is implied by our findings for overall trading inactivity 
or entry and exit from the market. 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we documented the extent and studied the determinants of 
household portfolio inertia in the face of the spread of equity culture and of 
considerable stock market index movements, using representative data from various 
waves of the PSID and SCF. Patterns of household entry and exit from the stock 
market depend on a number of household characteristics, but are not fundamentally 
different across the stock market upswing and downswing. The downswing is more 
likely to have encouraged staying out, rather than getting out of the market. 
Nevertheless, our findings imply somewhat stronger influences of minority status, 
poor health, and limited liquid resources on the decision to exit the market during the 
downswing. 
The vast majority of households in the population exhibit complete inactivity 
in trading stocks (not held in IRAs), across the upswing and downswing of the stock 
market, and even across the longer period we are able to consider (1984 to 2003). We 
find no evidence that the proportion of households who only sold stocks increased 
following the recent downswing, but we observe somewhat greater trading inactivity 
in the period 2001-2003 compared to 1999-2001.   31
We find positive effects of education on discouraging this inactivity, which 
become stronger following the downswing. Controlling for other characteristics, 
being young makes households more likely to be buying stocks rather than not trading 
during the upswing, but such effects disappear after the downswing. Entering 
retirement does not appear to encourage simple, uni-directional trades to liquidate 
stocks. Higher income or net financial assets encourage purchases of stocks alone as 
well as in conjunction with sales throughout the upswing and downswing. Following 
the downswing, net real wealth becomes significant and encourages purchases of 
stocks, even combined with sales. Receipt of inheritance or large gifts encourages 
simultaneous purchases and sales, and it also encourages trading with the market.  
Our findings also point to a resolution of the stark contrast between 
overtrading and inactivity found in existing literature that uses administrative data. 
Using representative SCF data, we document that only a small number of households 
own brokerage accounts, but the vast majority of those who do, trade within a year. 
Econometric analysis suggests that household demographics are quite important both 
for having a brokerage account and for the incidence and intensity of trading directly 
held stocks through this account. However, both the incidence and the frequency of 
trading through brokerage accounts are estimated to be also quite sensitive to 
movements in the stock market index.  
All in all, our findings based on population-wide surveys suggest that a 
number of household characteristics have systematic effects on incidence of trade and 
on trading patterns, but trading of directly held stocks and mutual funds among the 
overall population is both much less prevalent and less sensitive to stock market 
conditions than trading of directly held stocks among households with brokerage 
accounts.  32
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Appendix A: Simulated Average Marginal Effects 
 
Standard econometric packages automatically report marginal effects for each 
variable evaluated at mean remaining characteristics. Although it is standard practice 
to report such automatically generated marginal effects, this is often not economically 
relevant and sometimes even misleading. For example, it fails to distinguish among 
single dummy variables and groups of dummy variables that represent a given 
attribute; or properly evaluate effects of continuous variables entering with particular 
nonlinear forms; or of variables interacted with other regressors.
23. Deriving averages 
of marginal effects that have been first evaluated at each single observation can 
provide instead a more realistic and economically relevant interpretation.  
 
In this paper, we compute reported marginal effects in the following way. We start by 
estimating the relevant limited dependent variable model. We then simulate the model 
parameters (including ρ for models of bivariate probit and probit with selection) by 
making 1000 independent draws from the multivariate normal distribution, subject to 
the restrictions that the average of simulated values be equal to the respective 
estimated parameter and that the structure of the estimated robust variance covariance 
matrix be preserved. For each such set of simulated parameters, we calculate marginal 
effects for each individual household and then derive the weighted average marginal 
effect for the relevant population. We repeat the process for every set of simulated 
parameters, thus computing a series of average marginal effects. The mean of this 
series is the estimated marginal effect and the standard error is the simulated standard 
error of the marginal effect. 
 
In cases of bivariate probit and probit with selection models we distinguish between 
unconditional and conditional marginal effects, using the formulae described in Green 
(2000, p.857 & 860) and calculating the average marginal effects over the full and 
selected samples, respectively. This allows us to make statements for the population 
or for a specific group that meets the first stage condition, taking into account 
correlations in unobserved heterogeneity or correcting for sample selection.    
 
For SCF data, a final point is in order. SCF data have been constructed on the basis of 
repeated imputation, to eliminate missing values. Five different sets of imputed data 
are provided. We take into account this feature, by first applying the above procedure 
to each of the five implicates and then deriving marginal effects and standard errors 
that are corrected for multiple imputation according to Rubin (1987).  
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Appendix B: SCF Data Appendix (Table 10) 
 
non equity net Financial Wealth: Total Financial Assets – publicly traded Stocks –  
Other lines of credit - Credit Card Debt - Installment loans - Other Debt (loans against 
pensions, loans against life insurance, margin loans, miscellaneous) 
 
net Real Wealth: [1] + [2] + [3] + [4] + [5] - [6] - [7] - [8] 
[1]  Wealth in Primary Residence: Gross value of primary residence 
[2] Other Residential Real Estate (includes land contracts/notes household has made, 
properties - other than the principal residence - classified under certain codes for 
family residences, time shares and vacations homes) 
[3] Gross equity in Non-residential Real Estate (real estate - other than the principal 
residence, properties classified under certain codes for family residences, time shares, 
and vacation homes) 
[4] Business Equity (for businesses where the HH has an active interest, value is net 
equity if business were sold today, plus loans from HH to business, minus loans from 
business to HH not previously reported, plus value of personal assets used as 
collateral for business loans that were reported earlier; for businesses where the HH 
does not have an active interest, market value of the interest)  
[5] Other Wealth: value of vehicles plus other non-financial miscellaneous assets 
[6] Principal Residence Debt (mortgage, home equity loans and HELOCs --mopup 
LOCs divided between HE and other) 
[7] Debt for Other Residential Property (includes land contracts, residential property 
other than the principal residence, misc. vacation, and installment debt reported for 
cottage/vacation home) 
[8] Debt for non-residential real estate mortgages and other loans taken out for 
investment real estate 
 
Non-investment Income: income from wages, salaries, professional practice or 
business unemployment compensation, social security, annuity, or other pensions. 
 
Note: All monetary values have been deflated using the CPI-U-Research Series index and 
expressed into constant 2004 prices. 
 
No high school diploma (omitted variable): Highest grade completed (X5901)<12 & 
No high school diploma or passed equivalent test (X5902=5) High school graduate:  
Highest grade completed (X5901)<12 & Has got high school diploma (X5902=1) or 
passed equivalent test (X5902=2) OR Highest grade completed (X5901)=12 OR   
Highest grade completed (X5901)>12 & No college degree (X5904=5) College 
graduate:  Highest grade completed (X5901)>12 & Has got a college degree 
(X5904)=1 
 
Save for “rainy days”: The survey question is “Now I'd like to ask a few questions 
about your (family's) savings. People have different reasons for saving.  What are 
your (family's) most important reasons for saving?” The dummy refers to those 
reporting one of the following reasons: Emergencies; “rainy days”; other unexpected 
needs; for "security"/independence (X3006=25 or X3007=25). 
 
Financial alertness: The survey question is “When making major decisions about 
borrowing and saving, some people shop around for the very best terms while others  37
don't. What number would you be on the scale?” The 10-number scale ranges from 1-
“almost no shopping” to 10-“a great deal of shopping”. Since 1995 the above question 
has been replaced by two separate ones – one for borrowing and one for saving – with 
responses coded on a 1 to 5 scale. We have standardized these measures by averaging 
the two questions asked in post 1995 surveys and express them in 1-10 scale. The 
dummy represents those declaring that they do a great deal of shopping (values 9, 10 
in the scale). 
 
Credit constrained: Indicates household response that it has been turned down for 
credit in the past five years or did not receive amount originally requested or did not 
apply for credit because it thought it might be turned down. 
 
Willingness to take above average financial risk: The survey question is “Which of 
the following statements comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you and 
your (spouse/partner) are willing to take when you save or make investments? 
            1.  take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns 
            2.  take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns 
            3.  take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
            4. not willing to take any financial risks” 
The dummy represents those answering 1 or 2. (X3014=1 or X3014=2). 
 
Health poor: The survey question is “Would you say your health is excellent, good, 
fair, or poor?” Those describing their health as being poor are represented by the 
dummy (X6030=4). 
 
Bequest motive: Yes to “Do you expect to leave a sizable estate to others?” 
(X5825=1). 
 
Has received inheritance: Yes to “Have you ever received an inheritance, or been 
given substantial assets in a trust or in some other form?” (X5801=1). 
 
Financial Institutions doing business with: “With how many financial institutions 
do you and your family living here currently have accounts or loans, or regularly do 
personal financial business?  Include banks, savings and loans, credit unions, 
brokerages, loan companies, and so forth, but not institutions where you have only 
credit cards or business accounts” (X305). 
 
Long investment horizon: The dummy represents those declaring that a period 
longer than 5 years is important when making their family’s saving and spending plan 
(X3008) 
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Table 1a: Stock Ownership Status in 1994 and 1999  
 
1999   
1994  Non-stock owner  Stock owner 
Non-stock owner  42.9 
 
17.8 
 
Stock owner  7.7 
 
31.7 
 
Balanced PSID panel 1994,99,01,03 (families with no change in head). Family weights from 1999 
are used. “Stock” refers to shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment 
trusts – including stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs 
 
 
Table 1b: Stock Ownership Status in 1999 and 2003 
 
2003   
1999  Non-stock owner  Stock owner 
Non-stock owner  39.2 
 
11.4 
 
Stock owner  9.9 
 
39.4 
 
Balanced PSID panel 1994,99,01,03 (families with no change in head). Family weights from 1999 
are used. “Stock” refers to shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment 
trusts – including stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs 
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Table 2: Bivariate Participation Probit, 1994-99 
 
  Own in 1994  Own in 1999 
 Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Age<35 -.1282  5.12  -.0776  3.04 
35<Age<49 -.0583  3.09  -.0141  0.90 
Age>65 -.0126  0.27  .0002  0.01 
Married .0282  1.01  .0457  2.07 
# of children  -.0020  0.32  -.0158  3.10 
White .1643  9.73  .1772  17.00 
Health poor/fair  -.0523  1.74  -.0448  2.55 
High school graduate  .1502  7.41  .1635  8.99 
College graduate  .3190  11.44  .3412  19.59 
Income .0020  3.66  .0026  4.36 
non equity net Fin. Wealth  .0050  7.07  .0092  9.85 
net Real wealth  .0039  8.37  .0047  4.15 
Received inheritance last 5 yrs  .1349  3.73  .0856  4.63 
Moved, 1994-99    -.0008  0.07 
ρ ˆ   .484 (s.e. .028) 
Observations: 4,094  log likelihood: -4138.6 
 
Balanced PSID panel 1994, 99 of families with no change in head and with non zero financial 
wealth in at least one of the two waves. Ownership regards shares of stock in publicly held 
corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts –including stocks in employer-based pensions or 
IRAs. Variables refer to the year in question. Marginal effects, averaged across households (using 
1999 family weights), refer to changes in the probabilities of owning stocks in each of the two 
waves caused by changes in regressors. The regression accounts also for gender and labor status. It 
controls for income, non equity net financial wealth and net real wealth by logarithms using the 
transformation y=ln(x) if x≥1, y= - ln(|x|) if x≤-1 and y=0 if -1<x<1. The marginal effects for 
income, non equity financial wealth and net real wealth are based on a $1000 increase in the 
underlying variables. Numbers in italics report absolute t-values, derived from simulated standard 
errors (details can be found in appendix A).  
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Table 3: Bivariate Participation Probit, 1999-03 
 
  Own in 1999  Own in 2003 
  Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Age<35 -.0798  3.54  -.0718  4.47 
35<Age<49 -.0057  0.37  -.0454  4.25 
Age>65 -.0143  0.83  -.0214  1.26 
Married .0373  1.60  .0481  1.96 
# of children  -.0212  3.64  -.0235  3.23 
White .1761  15.23  .1988  14.93 
Health poor/fair  -.0177  0.97  -.0624  3.25 
High school graduate  .1723  8.71  .1375  8.66 
College graduate  .3423  19.67  .3388  19.74 
Income .0028  6.62  .0022  3.97 
non equity net Fin. wealth  .0091  11.58  .0113  10.89 
net Real wealth  .0048  4.43  .0032  2.86 
Received inheritance last 5 yrs  .0762  5.34  .0541  1.56 
Moved, 1999-03    .0015  0.12 
ρ ˆ   .553 (s.e. .026) 
Observations: 4884  log likelihood: -4684.2 
 
Balanced PSID panel 1999, 03 of families with no change in head and with non zero financial 
wealth in at least one of the two waves. Ownership regards shares of stock in publicly held 
corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts –including stocks in employer-based pensions or 
IRAs. Variables refer to the year in question. Marginal effects, averaged across households (using 
1999 family weights), refer to changes in the probabilities of owning stocks in each of the two 
waves caused by changes in regressors. The regression accounts also for gender and labor status. It 
controls for income, non equity net financial wealth and net real wealth by logarithms using the 
transformation y=ln(x) if x≥1, y= - ln(|x|) if x≤-1 and y=0 if -1<x<1. The marginal effects for 
income, non equity financial wealth and net real wealth are based on a $1000 increase in the 
underlying variables. Numbers in italics report absolute t-values, derived from simulated standard 
errors (details can be found in appendix A).   41
 
 
Table 4: Selected Marginal Effects on the Probability to Exit from the Stock 
Market Conditional on Participation in the first period 
 
Conditional marginal effects, averaged across households who own stocks in period one (using 1999 family 
weights), have been derived from the bivariate probit specifications presented in Tables 2 and 3. They refer to 
changes in the conditional bivariate probabilities of not owning stocks in period two given ownership in period 
one, caused by changes in regressors. The marginal effects for income, non equity financial wealth and net real 
wealth are based on a $1000 increase in the underlying variables in the second period. Numbers in italics 
report absolute t-values, derived from simulated standard errors (details can be found in the appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1994-1999  1999-2003 
 Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
   
White -.1225  7.73  -.1455  9.40 
Health poor/fair  .0261  1.53  .0591  2.98 
Income -.0013  2.71  -.0020  3.73 
non equity net  
Fin. wealth  -.0053  10.07  -.0066  10.28 
net Real wealth  -.0027  3.66  -.0024  2.69  42
Table 5a: Stock Trading Inertia and Stock Trading Practices over Time 
 
period  No trade  Buy only  Sell only  Buy & Sell 
1994-99  73.8 11.9  2.7 11.7 
1999-03  71.9 11.7  3.5 12.9 
1999-01  78.2 11.2  2.3  8.4 
2001-03  82.3 7.0  3.5 7.3 
Balanced PSID panel 1994,99,01,03 (families with no change in head, 4,169 observations). Family 
weights from 1999 are used. “Stock” refers to shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual 
funds, or investment trusts – not including stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs 
 
 
Table 5b: Stock Trading Inertia by Education of Household Head 
 
  No trade 94-99 No trade 99-03 No trade 99-01 No trade 01-03
Less than high school  93.8 95.1 97.3 97.3 
High school graduate  80.2 78.1 83.3 87.7 
College graduate  53.4 51.0 60.9 66.1 
Balanced PSID panel 1994,99,01,03 (families with no change in head). Education refers to the 
beginning of each period. Family weights from 1999 are used. “Stock” refers to shares of stock in 
publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts – not including stocks in employer-
based pensions or IRAs 
 
 
Table 5c: Stock Trading Inertia by Age of Household Head 
 
  No trade 94-99  No trade 99-03   No trade 99-01  No trade 01-03
Age<35  78.0 79.4  83.9 88.6 
35<Age<49  71.8 71.5  76.8 82.6 
49<Age<65  71.9 67.5  75.7 79.6 
Age>65  74.6 73.5  80.3 81.3 
Balanced PSID panel 1994,99,01,03 (families with no change in head). Age refers to the beginning 
of each period. Family weights from 1999 are used. “Stock” refers to shares of stock in publicly held 
corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts – not including stocks in employer-based pensions 
or IRAs 
 
 
Table 5d: Stock Trading Inertia by Non-equity Net Total Wealth 
 
Non-equity Net 
Total Wealth 
No trade 94-99  No trade 99-03   No trade  
99-01 
 No trade
 01-03 
1
st quartile     (<$11592)  90.5  (<$16742)  92.5  93.9 96.1 
2
nd quartile    ($11592< 
<$62140) 
78.9  ($16742< 
<$81852) 
80.7  85.5 89.3 
3
rd quartile    ($62140< 
<$176861) 
69.1  ($81852<  
<$212126) 
65.2  74.6 77.9 
4
th quartile     ($176861<) 56.8  ($212126<)  49.3  58.9 65.8 
Balanced PSID panel 1994,99,01,03 (families with no change in head). Net wealth quartiles from the 
beginning of each period are considered. Family weights from 1999 are used. “Stock” refers to 
shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts – not including 
stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs. Amounts refer to $2001 values. 
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Table 6: Stock Trading Inertia and Stock Trading Practices over Time 
 
period  No trade  Buy only  Sell only  Buy & Sell 
1984-89 *  72.0 13.4  2.9 11.7 
1989-94 *  70.2 18.0  1.7 10.0 
1994-99**  72.4 12.3  2.7 12.5 
1999-03**  70.0 12.7  3.8 13.4 
1999-01**  77.2 11.9  2.3  8.7 
2001-03**  80.7 7.5  3.9 7.8 
 
Balanced PSID panel 1989,94,99,01,03 (families with no change in head, 2,914 observations). 
Family weights from 1999 are used.   
*Refers to shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts – 
including stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs 
**Refers to shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts – not 
including stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs 
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Table 7: Multinomial Logit of Inertia in Trade and of Trading Practices: 1994-1999 
 
  No 
involvement 
with stocks 
Involvement 
with stocks, 
but no trade 
Buy only  Sell only  Buy & Sell 
  Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value
Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value
Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value
Age<35 .0616  2.37  -.1107 4.03  .0467 2.30  -.0321  3.10  .0345 1.78 
35<Age<49 .0344  1.45  -.0647 2.56  .0346 2.09  -.0251  2.45  .0208 1.29 
Age>65 -.0028  0.09  -.0174 0.49  -.0087 0.40  .0049  0.28  .0239 1.00 
Married -.0251  1.10  .0382 1.57  .0220 1.36  -.0022  0.24  -.0328 1.90 
# of children  .0160  2.30  .0093 1.25  -.0141 2.81  -.0011  0.39  -.0101 1.78 
White -.1950  10.86  .0512 2.90  .0521 4.59  .0229  3.83  .0689 6.33 
Health poor/fair  .0724  2.90  -.0325 1.25  -.0041 0.19  .0070  0.60  -.0428 2.27 
Health gets 
worse, 1994-99  .0346  1.28  .0167 0.55  -.0309 1.50  -.0061  0.53  -.0143 0.63 
High school 
graduate -.1806  6.99  .0940 3.82  .0611 3.74  .0024  0.22  .0230 1.37 
College graduate -.3549  11.89  .1196 4.12  .0992 5.14  .0106  0.82  .1256 6.08 
Become retired,  
1994-99 -.0091  0.27  -.0612 1.79  .0077 0.27  .0118  0.72  .0509 1.65 
Income -.0037  4.84  .0012 1.84  .0010 4.88  .0002  1.63  .0013 4.60 
non equity net  
Fin. Wealth  -.0063  6.96  .0030 3.60  .0022 4.38  -.0002  0.77  .0014 3.28 
net Real wealth  -.0039  3.37  .0028 3.04  .0006 1.24  .0000  0.03  .0004 0.80 
Received inheritance, 
1989-94  -.1272  4.03  .0576 1.70  -.0103 0.54  .0144  0.97  .0656 3.02 
Received inheritance, 
1994-99   -.1056  3.94  -.0455 1.77  .0670 3.32  .0007  0.06  .0834 4.41 
Moved, 1994-99  .0242  1.62  -.0255 1.59  -.0076 0.69  .0024  0.33  .0065 0.59 
Observations: 4,094  log likelihood: -4340.9 
 
Balanced PSID panel 1994,99 of families with no change in head and with non zero financial wealth in at least one of the two 
waves. Trading regards shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts – not including 
stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs. Marginal effects, averaged across households (using 1999 family weights), refer 
to changes in the probability of an event’s occurrence caused by changes in regressors. The regression accounts also for 
gender and labor status. It controls for income, non equity net financial wealth and net real wealth by logarithms using the 
transformation y=ln(x) if x≥1, y= - ln(|x|) if x≤-1 and y=0 if -1<x<1. The marginal effects for income, non equity financial 
wealth and net real wealth are based on a $1000 increase in the underlying variables and for children on the presence of an 
additional child. Numbers in italics report absolute t-values, derived from simulated standard errors (details can be found in 
appendix A).  
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Table 8: Multinomial Logit of Inertia in Trade and of Trading Practices: 1999-2003 
 
  No involvement 
with stocks 
Involvement 
with stocks, but 
no trade 
Buy only  Sell only  Buy & Sell 
  Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value 
Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value 
Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
t-
value 
Marginal
Effect  t-value 
Age<35 .0746  3.35  -.1043 4.54  .0120 0.71  .0011  0.09  .0166 1.02 
35<Age<49 
.0450  2.38  -.0634 3.04  .0212 1.47  .0060  0.60 
-
.0088 0.69 
Age>65 .0371  1.40  -.0330 1.00  -.0238 1.24  -.0050  0.40  .0247 1.03 
Married 
-.0301  1.44  .0386 1.69  .0113 0.76  .0283  2.49 
-
.0480 3.24 
# of children 
.0214  3.49  .0013 0.18  -.0065 1.34  -.0027  0.88 
-
.0136 2.67 
White -.1787  11.88  .0625 3.87  .0345 3.32  .0184  2.83  .0633 6.09 
Health poor/fair 
.0661  3.24  -.0258 1.06  -.0081 0.42  -.0141  1.51 
-
.0182 1.00 
Health gets worse
1999-01 .0526  2.15  -.0313 1.04  -.0089 0.41  -.0193  1.56  .0068 0.27 
Health gets worse
2001-03 .0606  2.45  -.0136 0.46  -.0173 0.77  -.0027  0.18 
-
.0270 1.22 
High school 
graduate -.1680  7.14  .0475 2.00  .0611 4.24  .0186  2.21  .0408 2.76 
College graduate  -.3240  11.58  .0363 1.32  .0944 5.41  .0401  3.89  .1533 8.73 
Become retired,  
1999-01  -.0317  0.90  -.0256 0.68  -.0161 0.65  .0267  1.18  .0467 1.60 
Become retired,  
2001-03 .1129  3.09  -.1002 2.67  .0123 0.40  -.0066  0.35 
-
.0184 0.75 
Income -.0033  4.23  .0015 2.59  .0006 2.26  -.0001  0.17  .0013 10.30 
non equity net  
Fin. Wealth  -.0089  9.62  .0055 6.35  .0018 3.84  .0002  0.57  .0014 4.55 
net Real wealth  -.0054  4.66  .0018 1.71  .0019 4.10  .0003  0.65  .0014 3.00 
Received inheritance
1994-99   -.0489  2.00  -.0561 2.24  .0001 0.01  .0277  2.22  .0772 4.56 
Received inheritance
1998-03 -.0473  1.44  -.0319 0.94  .0066 0.30  .0350  1.94  .0347 1.85 
Moved, 1999-01  -.0032  0.20  -.0410 2.35  .0085 0.67  .0149  1.62  .0208 1.56 
Moved, 2001-03  .0080  0.56  -.0218 1.27  .0079 0.65  .0003  0.03  .0057 0.45 
Observations: 4,976  log likelihood: -5341.9 
 
Balanced PSID panel 1999, 01 and 03 of families with no change in head and with non zero financial wealth in at least one of the 
three waves. Trading regards shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts – not including 
stocks in employer-based pensions or IRAs. Marginal effects, averaged across households (using 1999 family weights), refer to 
changes in the probability of an event’s occurrence caused by changes in regressors. The regression accounts also for gender and 
labor status. It controls for income, non equity net financial wealth and net real wealth by logarithms using the transformation 
y=ln(x) if x≥1, y= - ln(|x|) if x≤-1 and y=0 if -1<x<1. The marginal effects for income, non equity financial wealth and net real 
wealth are based on a $1000 increase in the underlying variables. Numbers in italics report absolute t-values, derived from 
simulated standard errors (details can be found in appendix A).   46
Table 9: Trading in the Population and Among Owners of Brokerage Accounts 
 
Period Stock  ownership 
rates * 
Brokerage 
account ** 
Stock trading 
rates *** 
Stock trading rates 
among brokerage 
account owners 
1988-89 16.9% 9.4%  6.8%  72.0% 
1991-92 17.0% 12.5%  8.6%  69.0% 
1994-95 15.3% 12.1%  8.3%  68.3% 
1997-98 19.2% 15.5%  11.8%  76.2% 
2000-01 21.3% 18.2%  13.5%  74.3% 
2003-04 20.7% 15.8%  10.4%  65.4% 
 
SCF 1989,92,95,98,01,04 weighted data. The reported statistics are corrected for multiple imputation. 
*     % of households with directly held equity 
**   % of households with a brokerage account for the purchase or sale of stocks and other securities 
*** % of households that bought or sold stocks or other securities through a broker 
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Table 10:  Probit model (with selection) of the Probability of Trading Stocks 
through Brokerage Accounts 
  Pr(Brokerage 
Account)   Pr(Trading)  
 
Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Marginal 
Effect  t-value 
Age .0012  6.32  .0013  2.36 
Male .0271  4.23  .0380  1.51 
Married -.0166  -2.73  .0154  0.77 
Has children  -.0203  -4.65  -.0119  -0.86 
White .0510  8.87  .0396  1.59 
Health poor  -.0397  -3.82  -.0110  -0.24 
High school graduate  .0581  8.89  .0321  0.76 
College graduate  .1406  19.49  .0970  2.27 
Save for “rainy days”  -.0016  -0.40  -.0181  -1.41 
Financial alertness  .0036  0.78  -.0080  -0.56 
Non-investment Income  .0005  5.04  .0004  0.83 
non equity net Financial Wealth  .0016  16.96  .0004  2.60 
net Real Wealth  .0017  24.18  .0010  2.06 
Bequest motive  .0531  11.69  .0444  3.71 
Has received inheritance  .0254  5.77  -.0053  -0.41 
Credit constrained  -.0309  -4.59  -.0021  -0.09 
Willingness to take above average  financial risk  .0676  14.09  .0582  4.98 
Long investment horizon  .0228  5.63  .0232  1.92 
Financial institutions doing business with: 2  .0561  10.40  .0434  1.60 
Financial institutions doing business with: 3  .0995  16.14  .0488  1.89 
Financial institutions doing business with: 4/5  .1499  21.81  .0719  2.76 
Financial institutions doing business with: 6 +  .2203  21.55  .0855  3.16 
Year 1992  .0265  5.24  -  - 
Year 1995  .0356  5.72  -  - 
Year 1998  .0398  6.15  -  - 
Year 2001  .0683  10.77  -  - 
Year 2004  .0512  9.21  -  - 
+1% in S&P 500 real growth rate  (>0)  -  -  .0089  5.05 
+1% in S&P 500  real growth rate (<0)  -  -  -.0148  -4.50 
ρ ˆ   .99 (se:.0034) 
Observations: 24,614  log likelihood: -12,089.6 
 
Pooled data from 1989,92,95,98,01,04 SCFs. Two-stage probit regression, correcting for selectivity bias among 
brokerage account owners. The specification accounts for age through a 2
nd order polynomial, and for labor 
status. It controls for logarithms of income, non equity net financial wealth and net real wealth using y=ln(x) if 
x≥1, y= - ln(|x|) if x≤-1 and y=0 if -1<x<1. “S&P500 real growth rates” (in the year preceding the interview), an 
interaction term with years showing a negative rate (1995 and 2001), and a dummy representing these years are 
included in the second stage to allow for asymmetric effects between periods of positive and negative rates. 
Marginal effects are averaged across households (using survey weights). The marginal effects for income, non 
equity financial wealth and net real wealth are based on a $1000 increase in the underlying variables and for age 
on a one year increase. Marginal effects in the second stage are calculated conditional on brokerage account 
ownership. For S&P500 real growth rate they show the effects on the probability of trading caused by a 1% 
increase in the S&P500 real growth rate during expansions and contractions. Numbers in italics report absolute 
t-values, derived from simulated standard errors (details can be found in appendix A). Reported estimates are 
corrected for multiple imputation.   48
Figure 1: Conditional Probabilities of Stock Ownership: Effects of Income and Wealth 
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Figure 2: Conditional Probabilities of Stock Ownership: The effect of Education 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Campbell (2006) argues that households make investment mistakes with respect to (non)participation, 
(under)diversification, and debt refinancing. Calvet, Campbell, Sodini (2005) find, using Swedish data, 
that mistakes are disproportionately present among groups of lower education and resources. Poor 
understanding of investment options has been linked to lack of international diversification (Graham, 
Harvey, Huang, 2005) and to poor planning for retirement  (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2005). 
2 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use data from the central register of shareholdings for Finnish stocks 
in the Finnish Central Securities Depository that cover all stock market participants (individuals and 
institutions) but obviously not individuals that are not stockholders. They employ Logit regressions to 
identify the determinants of buying and selling activity of individuals and institutions over a two-year 
period, and they find evidence that investors are reluctant to realize losses, that they engage in tax-loss 
selling activity, and that past returns and historical price patterns affect trading. 
3 Just under 90 percent made zero or one change in accumulated assets, while more than two thirds 
made zero or one change in their flow allocations. 
4 This is in line also with Sirri and Tufano (1998), who find a similar asymmetry for mutual fund flows: 
mutual fund consumers chase returns, flocking to funds with the highest recent returns, though failing 
to flee from poor performers. 
5 Milgrom and Stokey showed that, under rational expectations and regardless of the institutional 
structure, if the initial allocation is ex ante Pareto-optimal, then receiving private information cannot 
create incentives to trade. This is because, under Pareto optimality, the trader only hopes to find an 
advantageous bet, but the mere willingness of the other traders to accept their parts of the bet convinces 
at least one trader that his own part is unfavorable. Common knowledge that the trade is both feasible 
and acceptable to all traders is a crucial assumption for this result. 
6 See, for example, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Gollier (2001), Viceira 
(2001), Campbell and Viceira (2002), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout 
(2005), and Gomes and Michaelides (2005). 
7 For empirical estimates of thresholds to fixed entry costs, see Vissing Jorgensen (2002) and Paiella 
(2004). 
8 See, for example, Laibson et al. (2003). 
9 An early empirical study that documented such exits using a panel subsample of the SCF in the 
1980s, was Bertaut (1998). 
10 Barber and Odean (2000) found using their discount broker accounts data that the frequency of 
trading was lower in IRA accounts than in taxable accounts, and that liquidity shocks were more likely 
to induce trading in mutual funds than in directly held stocks.  They conjecture that the former finding 
is due either to tax-motivations or to more limited willingness of households to trade speculatively on 
their retirement accumulation because they associate it with future safety. The latter may be due to 
lower transactions costs associated with mutual fund trades. 
11 In regressions where endogeneity bias may be an issue, our net financial wealth measure does not 
include the value of stocks.  
12 All money values have been deflated using the CPI-U index and expressed into constant 2001 prices. 
13Survey collection issues include the following. First, the data center merges families with the same 
head, but it is conceivable that the head is the same but the family is different. Second, prior to 1999 
the question about stocks included stocks in IRAs, but in 1999 the question was split in two, separating 
IRAs from stocks in individual accounts and mutual funds. It is possible that some respondents' 
answers to the stock ownership question were affected by this change, especially if they were used to 
the old question sequence.  Third, the 2001 interview was the first where active saving questions refer 
to a two- rather than four-year period, and some errors might be due to this change. Fourth, some 
respondents may be thinking not in terms of the interval between interviews but in terms of calendar 
years. We are grateful to Ms. Donna Nordquist of the PSID for bringing these issues to our attention. 
14 This latter observation is consistent with the finding from SCF data that overall stockholding 
participation rates were slightly higher in 2001 than in 1998. 
15 When we use SCF data below, we are able to study frequency of trading stocks directly for 
households with brokerage accounts. 
16 This is not costless, as the requirement for a balanced panel lowers the number of observations from 
more than 4,000 to slightly less than 3,000. 
17 The only exception seems to be the increase in the proportion of households buying only under the 
broader definition of stockholding in the period 1989-94, presumably due to the sizeable entry of 
households into retirement accounts.  51
                                                                                                                                            
18 We use LR tests to see whether any of the categories we consider is statistically indistinguishable 
from another. For all possible pairs, we reject the null that a given pair of outcomes is 
indistinguishable. This reflects the distinct roles that variables in the model play for each of the options 
considered. 
19 All characteristics refer to the first period. We exclude households with zero financial wealth 
holdings at both endpoints of 1994-99, and those with zero financial wealth in all three waves 1999-
2001-2003. The latter choice explains the somewhat higher number of observations in the model of 
Table 7 compared to Table 3. Hausman tests failed to reject the IIA assumption for both models 
estimated over the periods 1994-99 and 1999-2003. 
20 We also consider changes of address (moves) during the period in question, which could be 
associated with asset rebalancing. Controlling for other changes that have already been mentioned, 
geographical moves do not appear to have significant effects on stock trading behavior before or after 
the downswing. 
21 Specifically, they took the following values: +.07 (12/1987-12/1988), +.23(12/1990-12/1991),           
-.04(12/1993-12/1994), +.29(12/1996-12/1997), -.13(12/1999-12/2001), +.24(12/2002-12/2003). 
22 Interaction terms for household characteristics did not turn out to be statistically significant, implying 
identical effects of characteristics on the incidence of trading through brokerage accounts across 
upswings and downswings, and they were not included in the final specification. 
23 There is growing discussion of these issues and an effort to provide codes that circumvent some 
inefficiencies of standard software packages (see, for instance, King et al., 2003; and Bartus, 2005). 
Brambor et al. (2005) discuss models with interactions and point to problems in empirical literature. 
We follow their notion in calculating the effect of the interacted S&P500 real growth rate.    CFS Working Paper Series: 
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